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 1 Introduction
Despite the existence of a vast literature on the robustness and optimality
of monetary policy rules, relatively little attention has been given to the is-
sue of monetary-ﬁscal interactions. A number of papers have examined the
interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policies using New Keynesian
dynamic general equilibrium models1, or game-theoretic models2, but none
of these models have been tested empirically. In this paper we jointly esti-
mate a small econometric model and monetary and ﬁscal policy rules for the
USA over the sample period 1970-2001. Our structural model is based on a
conventional New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model.
We use our estimated model to undertake a number of dynamic sim-
ulations, examining the responses of the endogenous variables (including
the policy instruments) to both exogenous shocks in the structural model
equations or unanticipated deviations from the policy rules. In addition,
we conduct a number of historical (counterfactual) dynamic simulations, su-
perimposing additional exogenous shocks to existing structural shocks and
deviations from the monetary and ﬁscal rules, to examine how policy-makers
might have reacted to diﬀerent scenarios.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the systematic responses of ﬁscal and monetary
policy instruments to each other do tend to depend critically on the nature
of the shocks hitting the economy. Whilst the New Keynesian structure of
the model suggests a degree of substitutability between the two policy in-
struments in response to unexpected shocks in the policy rules, our historical
simulations show that since the 1990s the two policy instruments have moved
together in a more complementary way. To a large extent this is attribut-
able to the nature of the underlying structural and policy shocks, which has
changed in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. In particular demand shocks have
become more predominant and the variance of deviations from policy rules
has been reduced.
Finally, we conduct some normative analysis with our estimated mod-
els, to evaluate whether the introduction of endogenous ﬁscal policy rules
markedly changes the optimal monetary policy rule. We thus compare our es-
t i m a t e dm o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l ew i t ho t h e r st h a tc a nb ed e r i v e df r o ma no p t i m a l
control exercise. Interestingly we ﬁnd that countercyclical ﬁscal policy can
be welfare-reducing in the presence of optimizing monetary policy-makers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will
brieﬂy survey the existing literature. In Section 3, we outline the structure
1of our estimated model and the empirical methodology. In Section 4, we
report our estimates and discuss our dynamic simulations, while in Section
5 we focus on optimal policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Existing Literature
Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001) explore the interdependence between the
ﬁscal authority and the central bank in a model where the latter has only par-
tial control over inﬂation, which is also directly aﬀected by the ﬁscal policy
stance. They show that in equilibrium the two policy rules are complements
when ﬁscal expansions have non-Keynesian (contractionary) eﬀects on out-
put and inﬂation. Buti, Roeger and in’t Veld (2001) suggest that the speciﬁc
form of interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policies, i.e. the al-
ternative between strategic substitutability and complementarity, should not
necessarily be interpreted in terms of conﬂi c to rc o o p e r a t i o n ,a n dm i g h tb e
shock-dependent. In their model supply shocks unambiguously induce con-
ﬂicting policies, whereas the opposite holds true for demand shocks.
Empirical contributions in this area are mainly based on panel data tech-
niques and VAR analyses. Cross-sectional or panel data examine the rela-
tionship between ﬁscal and monetary policies over the cycle. Work by Mélitz
(1997, 2000) and Wyplosz (1999) broadly supports the view that the two
policies are strategic substitutes. Von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett and Strauch
(2001) ﬁnd that the interdependence between the two policymakers is asym-
metric: looser ﬁscal stances match monetary contractions, whereas monetary
policies broadly accommodate ﬁscal expansions. Muscatelli, Tirelli and Tre-
croci (2001) examine the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary policy in-
struments using conventional VAR and Bayesian VAR models for several G7
economies, and show that the ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed in the VAR have a sig-
niﬁcant impact3.T h e yﬁnd that the result of strategic substitutability does
not hold uniformly for all countries. Moreover, they report strong evidence
that the linkage between ﬁscal and monetary policy has shifted post-1980,
when ﬁscal and monetary policies became much more complementary. The
main problem with the existing literature, and one of the key motivations for
the present paper, is the following: without a structural model it is diﬃcult
to interpret the empirical correlations between the two policy variables. In
the work of Mélitz (1997, 2000) and Wyplosz (1999) one cannot tell whether
the correlation between the policy instruments over the cycle derives from
2systematic policy responses or from responses to structural or policy shocks.
In the VARs estimated by Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2001) the focus
is on the reaction of policy instruments to other policy shocks, but it is
notoriously diﬃcult to interpret implicit policy reaction functions in VARs
especially if the ’true’ underlying structural model is forward-looking.
3 Empirical Methodology
As noted earlier, we estimate monetary and ﬁscal policy rules jointly with a
small structural model. We use a small forward-looking New-Keynesian DGE
model, comprising a dynamic IS model for output and a ’New Keynesian
Phillips Curve’ speciﬁcation for inﬂation. We ﬁrst outline the structural
model and then consider the monetary and ﬁscal rules to be estimated.
3.1 A New-Keynesian Structural Model
























where Ct represents consumption of a basket of goods (to be deﬁned
below), Ht is an index of external habits, ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion, Nt is the level of employment. Normalising the consumer’s time
endowment to unity, 1 − Nt+s represents leisure, and εl is a shock to labour
supply. Following Smets and Wouters (2002) we assume that habits depend
on past aggregate consumption:
H
i
t+s = λCt+s−1 (2)
Consumers maximise (1) subject to their intertemporal budget constraint,











t + Dt − Tt (3)
where consumers hold their ﬁnancial wealth (ai
t) in the form of one-period
state-contingent securities, which yield a return of rt. Consumer disposable
3income consists of labour income wi
tNi
t plus the dividends from the proﬁts of
the imperfectly competitive ﬁrms Dt, minus lump-sum taxes Tt.
This consumer problem has been explored extensively in the current lit-
erature using a variety of similar speciﬁcations (see for example Erceg, Hen-
derson and Levin, 2000; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001; Leith
and Malley, 2002; Smets and Wouters, 2002). Assuming that all consumers’
preferences and their initial holdings of ﬁnancial wealth are identical, the
problem can be solved as a dynamic optimization problem and we can ag-
gregate across consumers. Then, using the equilibrium condition for goods
markets, given that we ignore investment and the external sector4,
Yt = Ct + Gt (4)
we can derive the new-Keynesian IS curve by log-linearising the consump-
tion Euler equation and (4) around the steady state. This yields (ignoring
labour supply shocks) 5:
  yt =
λ
(1 + λ)
  yt−1 +
1
(1 + λ)





























where ’hatted’ lower-case variables represent percentage deviations from
the steady state. ’Barred’ variables denote steady-state values.
T u r n i n gn e x tt ot h em o d e lo fﬁrms’ pricing behaviour, we consider a
standard model of monopolistic competition with sticky prices, as set out in
Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001), and Leith and Malley (2002)6.F i r m s ’
production technology is assumed to be a simple Cobb-Douglas function of
labour and capital for each consumption good variety z. Capital is assumed
ﬁxed and normalized to unity:
Yt(z)=A(Nt(z))
1−α (6)
Total consumption is given by a standard CES function of imperfectly































where Pt(z) is the price of good z,a n dP is the consumption price index













Sticky prices are incorporated into this model, by assuming a Calvo pric-
ing mechanism, with some proportion (1 − ξ) of ﬁrms adjusting their prices
every period, and of these, a proportion (γ) indexing prices to inﬂation in
t h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d 7, and the rest (1 − γ) setting their prices optimally to
maximise expected discounted real proﬁts8, given technology, with a discount
factor equal to that of consumers, β.
The ﬁrms’ optimization, together with the assumptions about Calvo pric-
ing and indexation, lead to an expression for price-setting which can be log-
linearized to yield:
  πt =
γ
ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))
  πt−1 +
βξ
ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))
Et  πt+1
+
(1 − γ)(1 − ξ)(1 − γξ)
[ξ + γ(1 − ξ(1 − β))][1 + (α/(1 − α))θ]
  st (10)
where   st is the percentage change from steady state of the labour income
share, which is given9 by   st =   wt +   nt −   yt as in Leith and Malley (2002)
Equations (5) and (10) constitute our structural model to be jointly es-
timated with the policy rules. It is important to note that in estimating
(10), we treat real wages and employment as exogenous. Other recent con-
tributions (Leith and Malley, 2002, Smets and Wouters, 2002) estimate wage
5equations, and adding a wage equationw o u l dh a v ee n a b l e du st oc o n s i d e r
the possibility of sticky wage dynamics. However, this would have also added
to the complexity of the model.
It is worth noting that our model, in the tradition of many sticky-price
DGE models, continues to treat taxation as non-distortionary (lump-sum).
The lump-sum taxation assumption is one which is maintained by the ma-
jority of the recent DGE literature, including recent attempts to endogenise
ﬁscal policy10. This is in contrast to the theoretical modelling approach11 of
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001), which explicitly assumes that governments
only have access to distortionary income taxes or the inﬂation tax.
3.2 Monetary and Fiscal Rules
Our estimated monetary rule for the nominal interest rate   it follows a form
similar to the standard12 forward-looking Taylor rule speciﬁcation which has
become commonplace in the literature (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998,
2000; Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci, 2002a; Giannoni and Woodford, 2002a,
2002b),
  it = φ0 + φ1Et  πt+q+
m  
i=0
φ2i  yt + φ3
  it−1 (11)
where the rule also allows for interest-rate smoothing if φ3  =0 . In general
we ﬁnd that the best ﬁt for this model is found for the speciﬁcc a s ew h e r e
q =1 13.
As far as ﬁscal policy is concerned, we estimate simple backward-looking
models. This captures the more realistic sluggish response of ﬁscal policy to
macroeconomic variables, partly because of the frequency with which ﬁscal
policy is set, but also because a major component of ﬁscal policy reaction will
be due to automatic stabilizers. We estimate separate models for government
spending and taxation, and in each case we also allow the variables to respond
to output; we also include a stabilization mechanism that captures the impact
of the lagged budget deﬁcit to GDP ratio on current policy,






δ2i  yt−i + ψ1(bd)t−k (12)






ϕ2i  yt−i + ψ2(bd)t−k (13)
6where bdt is the budget deﬁcit to GDP ratio. As we shall see below,
we generally ﬁnd that setting k =4for the deﬁcit-correction term pro-
vides a good ﬁt, whilst only a few lags (typically one or two) are needed
on the autoregressive terms and on the output terms. Theoretical models
of ﬁscal-monetary interactions postulate that the two policymakers’ objec-
tive functions are deﬁned over identical objectives, typically inﬂation and
the output gap (Dixit and Lambertini 2000, 2001). In contrast with this ap-
proach, Taylor (2000a, b) estimates a ﬁscal reaction function where the ﬁscal
stance index targets the output gap and the debt/GDP ratio, ﬁnding that
countercyclical ﬁscal policy is almost entirely characterized by the working
of automatic stabilizers. Similarly Bohn (1988) ﬁnds a relationship between
primary ﬁscal deﬁcits and the debt/GDP ratio.
Our ﬁscal rules, which allow for autoregressive components and for a de-
layed response to the output gap, are inspired to the work of Taylor (2000a,
b). We have also chosen to estimate separate equations for taxes and ex-
penditures, in order to characterize the eﬀects of expenditures on the output
gap. Our use of the deﬁcit/GDP ratio as a ’correction mechanism’ instead of
the debt/GDP ratio is motivated by the fact that the former is found to be
much more signiﬁcant14. Because of the absence of the debt/GDP ratio from
our ﬁscal rules our simulations do not include debt-deﬁcit dynamics. This
raises the question of whether our ﬁscal rules pin down the deﬁcit/GDP ratio
to a sustainable level. Below we demonstrate that in historical simulation
our ﬁscal rules track the actual evolution of the debt-GDP ratio quite closely
and imply a stable path for debt.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Scope of the Study
We now turn to the empirical results15. We estimate the New-Keynesian
model jointly with the monetary and ﬁscal rules, comprising (5), (10), (11),
(12) and (13). The model is estimated on US data. Note that the spending
data excludes transfers. Although our data includes interest payments, the
behaviour of   gt appears very similar when one uses data excluding interest
payments. The sample period is 1970(1)-2001(2). Although an estimated ﬁs-
cal reaction function on quarterly data may seem unrealistic as a description
of discretionary ﬁscal policy, it is worth bearing in mind that these ﬁscal rules
7will largely capture (as in Melitz, 1997) the eﬀects of automatic stabilizers.
The data have been seasonally adjusted (X-11 method), and to capture
the spirit of the NK models as log-linearizations, the data are transformed so
that the variables are expressed in deviations from the ’steady state’16.R e a l
variables are de-trended17, whilst the series on inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate are demeaned. Note that as the inﬂation rate and interest rate
always enter the model together, all the equations are ’balanced’ in terms of
the levels of integration of the dependent and explanatory variables.
4.2 Estimation Methods
The New Keynesian model consists of equations that are non-linear in para-
meters. Following Hansen (1982) a model with rational expectations suggests
some natural orthogonality restrictions that can be used in the generalized
methods of moments (GMM) framework. Thus, (5), (10), (11), (12) and (13)
make up a system of linear and non-linear equations of the form:
yt = f(θ,zt)+ut (14)
where yt is the vector of dependent variables, θ is the (a × 1) vector
of unknown parameters to be estimated, and zt is the (k × 1) vector of
explanatory variables. The GMM approach is based on the fact that   θ, the




and xt is an (r ×1) vector of instruments that are correlated with zt.G M M
then chooses the estimate θ so as to make the sample moment as close as
possible to the population moment of zero. In our estimates we use four
lags of the dependent variables and the exogenous variables, plus four lags of
commodity price inﬂation as instruments. The validity of these instruments
can be tested using Hansen’s J-test, which is distributed as a χ2(r − a)
statistic under the null of valid orthogonality conditions.
GMM or IV estimation has been used by a number of authors to estimate
NK models18. One problem is that the estimated IS and NKPC equations
are highly nonlinear in parameters, and the rank condition for identiﬁcation
is not met unless a number of parameters in these two equations are ﬁxed.
We follow Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) and Leith and Malley (2002)
in imposing restrictions on some of the parameters. We ﬁx θ =4 , implying
ap r i c e - m a r k - u p 19 of 30%, 1 − α =0 .6 in the NKPC equation. Moreover,








8equal their sample average value.
However, it is worth noting that even with these restrictions, since there
are no cross-equation restrictions, the parameter estimates are poorly deﬁned.
Therefore, as we note below, we had to impose additional restrictions in order
to obtain parameter estimates that were statistically well-deﬁned.
In a sense, the GMM approach consists of ﬁxing some parameters based
on theoretical motivations, or earlier empirical studies, and estimating some
parameters freely. In this context, it might be better to recognize at the
outset that the researcher is bringing some prior information to bear on the
estimation exercise by making such priors explicit. This suggests that a
Bayesian approach might be a more natural vehicle to estimate New Key-
nesian structural models, and this is the approach followed in Smets and
Wouters (2002). In a current extension of this work, we are examining how
our results change if one uses a Bayesian estimation approach.
The policy rules are more straightforward. For the monetary policy rule
we ﬁnd that a single lead for inﬂation and a zero lag on output ﬁt the data
best. For the ﬁscal rules we ﬁnd that up to two lags on output and the AR
term provided an adequate characterization of the ﬁscal variables, in addition
to setting k =4so that the ﬁscal variables react to the previous year’s budget
deﬁcit/GDP ratio.
4.3 Model Estimates
Table 1 below reports the estimated New Keynesian model using GMM over
the full sample period. In estimating the NK output equation, we use the
ex ante real interest rate (  rt =   it − Et  πt+1). As noted above, we found that
the parameter estimates were relatively imprecise, even after imposing the
restriction suggested by theory that (λ,β,γ,ξ) should all be less than unity.
We therefore conducted a grid search and ﬁxed the discount factor at 0.89,
a value consistent with that estimated by Galí, Gertler and López-Salido
(2001). This improved the precision of the other parameter estimates.
9Table 1: Model Estimates









































The R-squared for the output equation was 0.98, for the inﬂation equation
0.98, for the monetary policy rule 0.89, and for the government spending and
taxation rules 0.92 and 0.67 respectively. Hansen’s J-test has a value of 116.5,
which is insigniﬁcant as it is distributed as a χ2(125) statistic under the null
of valid instruments20. The restrictions imposed on the model’s parameters
can be tested using the Newey-West D test, based on the diﬀerences in the
criterion function between the unrestricted and restricted models, which in
our case has a value of 0.458 and is distributed as a χ2(4) under the null of
valid restrictions.
Turning ﬁrst to the structural equations, the estimated NKPC parame-
ters are comparable to those obtained for the USA by Leith and Malley
(2002) and by Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001), and are also consis-
tent with similar estimates for the euro area by Smets and Wouters (2002)
using Bayesian estimation techniques. The Calvo parameter ξ indicates on
10average an adjustment period of just over 2 quarters, but with a large pro-
portion of ﬁrms indexing prices. By using an additive habit formulation,
in contrast to Leith and Malley, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant habit persistence in US
consumption behaviour, consistent with a coeﬃcient of about 0.5 on lagged
output. This conforms better with earlier empirical work on US consumption
behaviour, which suggests considerable inertia. It should also be noted that,
if one estimates the unrestricted form of the NK model without identifying
the individual structural parameters from the parameter convolutions, the
lagged output term in the IS equation is highly signiﬁcant. The estimate for
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion ρ is not dissimilar to that estimated
for the Euro area by Smets and Wouters (2002)21.
Turning to our policy rules for the US, we see that, as is common with
estimated interest rate reaction functions22, there is a high degree of interest-
rate inertia, φ3 =0 .874. The long-run response to inﬂation, even when the
forward-looking policy rule is estimated over the full sample, is greater than
unity (1.19), and the response to output is also signiﬁcant (a long-run re-
sponse of 1.317). Had we estimated the policy rule over the post-1980 sam-
ple, we would have found an even greater response to inﬂation, with the
response on output dependent on the actual sub-sample used23.T h e f o r m
of the ﬁscal rules is very similar, except that the tax rule only responds to
contemporaneous output. Interestingly, the government spending response
to the contemporaneous output gap is not stabilizing, but taken together, the
coeﬃcients δ20 and δ21 imply a negative eﬀect of the output gap on govern-
ment spending. This short-run eﬀect on government spending is smaller than
that on taxation, which reacts more strongly and positively to the output
gap. The magnitude of the taxation eﬀect is more similar to that estimated
by Taylor (2000a,b) for the US budget deﬁcit. Both ﬁscal rules indicate a
strong persistence, but a tendency for a correction to the previous year’s
deﬁcit to GDP ratio. Given the short lags on the ﬁscal rules, the responses
to output probably capture automatic stabilizer eﬀects, with the correction
to the deﬁcit capturing discretionary policy, which acts with a longer (1-year)
lag.
114.4 Dynamic and Stochastic Simulations
4.4.1 Dynamic Simulations
Having estimated our structural model, we now perform a number of dynamic
simulation experiments to investigate the way in which ﬁscal and monetary
policies interact in this simple NK model.
We perform three diﬀerent simulation experiments24:
(i) A dynamic model solution, shocking each structural equation and pol-
icy equation in turn, to simulate the eﬀects of a structural or policy shock on
the other endogenous variables in the model. Essentially this involves simu-
lating the model without any reference to actual data. The two exogenous
variables in the labour-income share,   st, i.e. the real wage (   wt) and em-
ployment (  nt), are simulated as follows. We assume that nominal wages are
indexed to inﬂation with a one-period lag, whilst employment is determined
by a log-linearization of the short-run production technology (6).
(ii) A historical simulation, setting all the policy shocks (deviations from
systematic policy) equal to zero for part of our sample, but maintaining the
implicit structural shocks implied by the residuals of the output and inﬂation
equations, and using actual data on the exogenous variables (real wages and
employment)25. We then examine the implications for the policy variables,
inﬂation and output. This allows us to see the extent to which the deviations
from policy can be really seen as ’destabilising’, or whether they might in
fact be interpreted diﬀerently.
(iii) A ’what if’ historical simulation, in which we superimpose a policy
shock (deviation from systematic policy) on a historical scenario, maintaining
all the structural and policy shocks in place.
This will allow us to see the extent to which the observed co-movements
in the ﬁscal and monetary instruments are due to the systematic policy rules,
or are driven by the exogenous variables, or the structural and policy shocks.
The historical simulations involve us ﬁrst creating a simulation base by
producing a dynamic model forecast for part of our sample. We choose to
do this over the latter part of the sample (from 1990(1) onwards), as it was
a period in which both the structural and policy shocks were rather smaller
than in the 1970s and 1980s. All the historical simulations will then be
reported as deviations from this simulation base to see how the additional
elements aﬀect the model’s simulation run. The results of the dynamic model
solution are shown26 in Figure 1. The results of historical simulation (ii) (no
12policy deviations) are shown in Figure 2. For reasons of space, the results
of historical simulation (iii), adding a further shock to the historical shocks,
are not shown in detail27.
Figure 1: Dynamic Simulation (i) - Model Responses to
Temporary Shocks
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Note: The temporary shocks on the model are a 1% increase in the period of
the shock, followed by an gradual reduction with an AR parameter of 0.5, until
the shock disappears 1 year after its impact.
13Figure 1 (cont’d): Dynamic Simulation (i) - Model Responses to
Temporary Shocks
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Note: The temporary shocks on the model are a 1% increase in the period of
the shock, followed by an gradual reduction with an AR parameter of 0.5, until
the shock disappears 1 year after its impact.
14Before turning to the analysis of ﬁscal-monetary interactions, we can
make some general remarks about the simulation properties of the estimated
model. By looking at Figure 2 we see that by omitting the deviations from
the systematic policy rules, the model accentuates the recession in the early
1990s. This in turn induces a cyclical adjustment in output and inﬂation (and
hence the policy variables). It seems diﬃcult to believe that such policy de-
viations can be interpreted as ’policy errors’. A more plausible interpretation
is that interest-rate rules display non-linearities, either of the form of non-
linear reactions to policy targets28, or in the form of a variable interest-rate
smoothing term, which causes the authorities to switch from periods of ac-
tivism to periods of a ’wait and see’ attitude. Alternatively, one might argue
that estimated ’policy errors’ might capture relatively frequent shifts in sys-
tematic policy rules. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) highlight one
particular shift in the monetary policy rule around the early 1980s, but Mus-
catelli, Trecroci and Tirelli (2002a) provide evidence that shifts may have
occurred even after the Volcker years. Favero and Monacelli (2003) identify
an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent ﬁscal regimes in the USA.
We now look at the reactions of monetary and ﬁscal policy to various types
of shock in the dynamic simulations (Figure 1). Following an output shock
it is apparent that monetary and ﬁscal policies move in a similar direction
(are complements), but tend to be slightly out of phase for the ﬁrst few
quarters for the NK model. In contrast, the systematic response of the two
policies tends to be in the opposite direction (are substitutes) following an
unanticipated deviation in either policy rule or in the case of an inﬂation
shock.
Historical simulation (ii) shows that, for the 1990s, ﬁscal and monetary
policies have become more complementary (Figure 2). This result conﬁrms
earlier evidence on complementarity during the 1990s obtained using VARs
(see Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci, 2001). Superimposing an ’as if’ output
and inﬂation shock on the historical simulations, in simulation (iii) does not
markedly alter the picture supporting complementarity between ﬁscal and
monetary policy over the cycle.
Another interesting aspect of the simulations is that, given the inertia
eﬀects in the monetary policy rule, the complementarity between policy in-
struments is only apparent for part of the adjustment process to an output
shock in Figure 1. After an inﬂation shock (because of its impact on real
interest rates and the inertia in monetary policy) the two instruments do
tend to be out of phase and tend to be substitutes for a long period of time.
15Figure 2: Historical Simulation (ii) 1990(i)-2001(ii) - All vari-
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The intuition behind this is simple: with the real interest rate targeting
inﬂation as well as output, whilst the ﬁscal rules depend essentially on output,
16the inﬂation shock triggers the reaction of monetary instruments, whereas
ﬁscal variables simply adjust, with a lag, to the output eﬀects of monetary
contraction.
We can also use historical simulation (ii) to see how policy instruments
should have deviated from a baseline simulation in which all the policy devi-
ations were included. Here the NK model seems, at least for the early 1990s,
to suggest a path for real interest rates which is close to the baseline. With
the exception of the period 1997(2)-1998(4), where the policy rule suggests
t h a ti n t e r e s tr a t e ss h o u l dh a v eb e e nh i g h e r ,t h ep o l i c yr u l et r a c k st h eb a s e l i n e
quite closely. This suggests that US monetary policy was too expansionary
in the late 1990s from the viewpoint of an NK model where the structural
shocks are retained. As far as ﬁscal policy is concerned, the estimated model
suggests a systematic deviation of government spending and taxation from
the policy rule in the period 1992-94, which is probably connected to the
deﬁcit correction phase. In the longer run, the US ﬁscal rules capture the
behaviour of ﬁscal policy in the late 1990s more precisely.
As discussed earlier, given that we do not model the feedback from debt
accumulation to spending and taxation, one issue is whether our ﬁscal rules
imply a dynamic path for government debt which is (a) sustainable and,
in the case of the historical simulations, (b) close to the actual path. To
verify this, we simulate the path of the debt/GDP ratio that is implied by
the ﬁscal and monetary policy rules29. Figure 3 plots the actual path of
the US debt-GDP ratio post-1990 and the simulated path resulting from
historical simulation (ii). It is apparent that the model tracks the actual
path of debt reasonably closely, whilst the simulated debt series captures the
delayed adjustment in the deﬁcit in the early to mid-1990s which is apparent
in Figure 2.
17Figure 3: Debt/GDP Dynamics for Historical Simulation (ii)
Overall, the general pattern which emerges from our simulations is one
where ﬁscal and monetary policy are more complementary following output
shocks than following policy shocks or inﬂation shocks. Historical simulations
for the 1990s tend to support a greater complementarity for the two policy
instruments in the USA, with a greater propensity for taxation to act in
concert with real interest rates. We now verify whether these patterns for
the 1990s may be due to a speciﬁcc o n ﬁguration of shocks during that period,
by conducting some stochastic simulations.
4.4.2 Stochastic Simulations
To verify the importance of the structural and policy shocks in determining
the pattern of ﬁscal and monetary responses over the whole sample period
relative to the role of the structural models, we now conduct some stochastic
simulations. Essentially we simulate the estimated models using 200 diﬀerent
replications of the shocks, which are drawn using the estimated variance-
covariance matrix of residuals. In order to demonstrate that the main factor
which seems to have changed in the relationship between monetary and ﬁscal
policy during this period is the correlation between the underlying shocks, we
repeat this procedure for three diﬀerent replications of the shocks. For the
18ﬁrst set of stochastic simulations we use the estimated variance-covariance
matrix of residuals for the full sample. We then repeat the simulations using
a variance-covariance matrix of shocks over the ﬁrst 19 years of the sample
(up to 1989), and then using the estimated variance-covariance matrix of
residuals for the 1990s.
The correlation between the monetary and ﬁscal instruments for the av-
erage of the replications is reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Stochastic Simulations Using Estimated
Variance-Covariance Matrix
of Structural and Policy Shocks
Policy Instruments Full Sample 1970-89 1990s
  gt,   rt 0.014 (-) 0.763 (-) -0.401 (+)
  τt,   rt -0.163 (-) -0.387 (-) 0.298 (+)
  τt,   gt 0.463 0.242 0.538
The (-) sign indicates that the ﬁscal and monetary instrument are acting as
strategic substitutes, whilst the (+) indicates that they are acting as strategic
complements.
The pattern of results is striking: the tendency for ﬁscal and monetary
policy to become strategic complements seems to be a phenomenon restricted
to the 1990s with the full-sample estimates and especially the 1970-1989
period showing a tendency for ﬁscal and monetary policy to move in opposite
directions over the cycle. Thus, the suggestion that monetary and ﬁscal
policy have been acting in a more complementary way since the 1990s is
probably just a function of the particular conﬁguration of shocks during
that period rather than due to the structure of the model, or the estimated
variance-covariance matrix of the shocks over the full sample period.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy
So far our analysis has been strictly positive, focusing on the degree to which
ﬁscal and monetary policy have acted in concert over the cycle. The question
now is: how much does it matter for stabilization policy? Whilst a great deal
of attention has been given in recent years to the problem of designing optimal
monetary policy rules in the context of forward-looking models (see Giannoni
19and Woodford, 2002a for a comprehensive survey), very little attention has
been paid to the issue of monetary-ﬁscal policy interactions over the cycle.
Does a countercyclical ﬁscal policy assist the monetary policy-maker or does
the lack of co-ordination between the two policies, especially when both are
highly inertial, cause a reduction in welfare?
We now use our estimated models to consider how the introduction of
endogenous ﬁscal rules might impact on monetary policy. We conduct two
types of experiment. First we compute some optimal monetary policy rules,
and consider how these are aﬀected by the presence of endogenous ﬁscal
rules. Second, we consider how our optimal monetary rules diﬀer from the
rules that emerge from an optimization exercise, and again verify what im-
pact assuming endogenous ﬁscal policy has on the divergence between the
estimated and optimal monetary policy rule. We compute the optimal rule
using the standard optimal control approach30 (see Currie and Levine, 1993,
Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999).
Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b) provide an alternative perspective to
optimal monetary policy rules. Whilst rules derived using an optimal control
approach are necessarily optimal vis-à-vis a particular pattern of exogenous
disturbances, Giannoni and Woodford show that certain classes of monetary
policy rules, such as our estimated rule, involving both a forward-looking ele-
ment and an inertial element31, turn out to be particularly robust to diﬀerent
types of exogenous disturbances. Whilst this suggests that considerable care
has to be exercised in deﬁning rules as optimal when they have not been
tested for robustness against a variety of diﬀerent stochastic disturbances32,
our aim here is more limited. The optimal control exercises are merely bench-
marks to examine what diﬀerence introducing endogenous ﬁscal policy makes
to monetary policy reactions. Whether our estimated policy rules turn out
to be optimal from a wider perspective is an issue that we leave to further
work.
We derive our optimal monetary rules using the following intertemporal
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As our model has forward-looking variables, we need to consider whether
to focus on the optimal policy under pre-commitment or discretion. We
20focus on the optimal policy under pre-commitment. Again, as we are simply
benchmarking our estimated and optimal policy rules under two diﬀerent
scenarios (endogenous and exogenous ﬁscal policy), this choice should not
markedly aﬀect our results.
We consider the monetary policy responses under two alternative struc-
tural shocks (a temporary output shock and a temporary inﬂation shock)
using both the estimated monetary policy rule, and three possible optimal
policy rules, corresponding to diﬀerent values of the parameters of the loss
function (15):
(i) Optimal Policy Rule I: Φ1 = Φ2 =1(equal weights on loss function
terms).
(ii) Optimal Policy Rule II: Φ1 =1 ,Φ2 =0 .5 (lower weight on interest-
rate adjustment)
(iii) Optimal Policy Rule III: Φ1 =0 .1,Φ2 =0 .5 (low weight on output).
For each shock and the four diﬀerent types of monetary policy rule, we
consider two scenarios: ﬁrst, one where the endogenous ﬁscal policy equations
are switched on in the model simulations; and second, one where ﬁscal policy
is kept exogenously ﬁxed.
Table 3 shows the loss function value under each scenario and each struc-
tural shock, for the four policy rules. For the estimated policy rule, the loss
column shows three values, indicating the losses under the loss function pa-
rameterizations underlying the three optimal policy rules. We also show the
detailed interest rate responses under the four monetary policy rules for both
ﬁscal policy scenarios under one shock. Figures 4 shows the interest-rate re-
sponse to an output shock assuming endogenous ﬁscal policy, and Figures 5
is the corresponding simulations keeping ﬁscal policy exogenously ﬁxed.
21Figure 4: Endogenous Fiscal Policy, Interest Rate Reaction to
Output Shock
Figure 5: Exogenous Fiscal Policy, Interest Rate Reaction to
Output Shock
22Table 3: Optimal Monetary Policy Responses to Fiscal Scenarios
Shock Rule Value of Loss Function
Endogenous Fiscal Policy   yt Estimated Rule 87.8/83.4/12.6
  yt Optimal Rule I 7.4
  yt Optimal Rule II 4.3
  yt Optimal Rule III 2.9
  πt Estimated Rule 264.6/247.3/78.7
  πt Optimal Rule I 59
  πt Optimal Rule II 48
  πt Optimal Rule III 44
Exogenous Fiscal Policy   yt Estimated Rule 25.9/24.6/5.9
  yt Optimal Rule I 2.1
  yt Optimal Rule II 1.6
  yt Optimal Rule III 3.8
  πt Estimated Rule 131.0/122.7/59.1
  πt Optimal Rule I 52
  πt Optimal Rule II 53
  πt Optimal Rule III 57
Table 3 shows quite clearly that the welfare loss under the estimated
policy rules is greater in the presence of endogenous ﬁscal policy rules than
when ﬁscal policy is kept exogenously ﬁxed, as the ﬁscal policy response
reduces the welfare to the monetary authorities. This is despite the fact
that, in some instances, especially following output shocks, the two policy
instruments move together. The intuition behind this result is essentially
that the ﬁscal rules are highly inertial, and thus will not act to stabilize
output according to the monetary authorities’ optimal path.
Thus the endogenous ﬁscal response to the structural shock causes the
monetary authorities to react more vigorously. The simulation plots provide
some quantitative insights into the importance of this eﬀect: comparing Fig-
ures 4 and 5 we see that the estimated rule predicts an interest rate response
with endogenous ﬁscal responses during the ﬁr s tf e wq u a r t e r sw h i c hi s3 0 - 1 0 0
basis points greater than with ﬁscal policy kept exogenously ﬁxed. Under the
23optimal policies the increased response with endogenous ﬁscal policy is even
greater, reaching 80-100 basis points under Optimal Rule III.
Another point to note is that with an endogenous ﬁscal policy it is very
diﬃcult for the policy rules to bring output quickly under control: this is
less evident with the optimal policy rule, but more evident with our forward-
looking estimated rule, where endogenous ﬁscal policy seems to add consid-
erable output instability in the ﬁrst few quarters.
Next, we should note that the optimal rules produce patterns of adjust-
ment for the instrument and the target variables which are very diﬀerent from
those obtained using the estimated rule. Whilst this may seem sub-optimal,
the smooth adjustment which obtains using the forward-looking and inertial
rule is evidence of the robustness of these responses to diﬀerent shocks, a
point emphasized by Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b). To emphasize this
point, consider what happens if one induces a smoother adjustment to the
optimal policy rule by raising the costs of interest-rate adjustment (setting
the parameters Φ1 =1 ,Φ2 =5 , which we label Optimal Rule IV), and simu-
lating the interest-rate reaction to an output shock (Figure 6), assuming an
exogenously ﬁxed ﬁscal policy. Although the adjustment of the instrument
is quite close to that predicted by the estimated rule, especially over the ﬁrst
few quarters, the interest-rate adjustment under the inertial forward-looking
rule is much smoother than the solution under pre-commitment.
Figure 6: Exogenous Fiscal Policy, Interest Rate Response.
Optimal Policy Rule with High Adjustment Costs
24Naturally, the estimated impact of ﬁscal policy on monetary policy reac-
tions here is dependent on the fact that the two policies interact exclusively
through the aggregate demand channel rather than through distortionary
taxation eﬀects on consumption, substitution eﬀects between government
and private consumption, or tax-wedge eﬀects on price- and wage-setting be-
haviour and on debt-servicing costs. Adding these channels would produce a
richer picture of monetary-ﬁscal interactions, and might suggest a very diﬀer-
ent response to endogenous ﬁscal policy. However, providing that both rules
contain a large inertial component, the sub-optimality from not co-ordinating
ﬁscal and monetary policies will probably still be very signiﬁc a n t ,e v e ni na
diﬀerent structural model.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The main contribution of this paper has been to provide a structural econo-
metric interpretation to the macroeconomic interactions between ﬁscal and
monetary policies. We have estimated a New Keynesian model of inﬂation
and output jointly with monetary and ﬁscal rules using data from the US,
to provide some understanding of the way in which diﬀerent macroeconomic
policy instruments interact over the business cycle.
The existing evidence on monetary-ﬁscal interactions over the cycle sug-
gests that, whilst over a panel of countries the two policy instruments do
tend to counteract each other over the cycle (Melitz, 1997, 2000, Wyplosz,
1999), there is increasing evidence of complementarity over the period since
1980 (Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci, 2001), or at least asymmetric comple-
mentarity (Von Hagen, Hughes Hallett and Strauch, 2001).
The evidence from this paper substantiates the conjecture in Buti, Roeger
and int’ Veld (2001) that the nature of the interaction between the two
policy instruments should depend on the nature of the shocks hitting the
system. Indeed, we have shown that for the case of output shocks ﬁscal
and monetary policies tend to act in harmony, whereas they are used as
substitutes following inﬂation shocks or shocks to one policy instrument.
Furthermore, the apparent shift to policy complementarity observed in the
1990s is mainly due to the speciﬁcc o n ﬁguration of shocks observed in that
period.
25We further showed that the perspective on ﬁscal-monetary interactions
also depends critically on the type of structural model ﬁtted to the data.
Again, this is an important point, as the existing literature relies on reduced-
form models or VAR analysis which cannot disentangle the role played by
diﬀerent structural interpretations and by shocks to the correlation between
the two policy instruments.
Finally we provide some preliminary normative analysis of the impact of
ﬁscal policy on the design of optimal policy rules. Perhaps surprisingly, it
turns out that the presence of an endogenous ﬁscal policy rule is welfare-
reducing. The reason for this seems to be the inertial nature of the ﬁscal and
monetary policy rules. There is however a substantive distinction between
the two policy rules. In fact monetary policy rules are explicitly designed
for stabilization purposes, whereas the design of automatic stabilizers is gen-
erally driven by concern for distributional issues (Taylor, 2000a). Perhaps
the time has come for ﬁscal policymakers to reconsider the issue, taking into
account both the countercyclical role of ﬁscal policy and the need for better
coordination in the design of policy rules. This would seem to be a proﬁtable
area of further research.
The biggest shortcoming of the approach followed here is that it allows
very limited scope for the two policy instruments to interact, focusing ex-
clusively on the aggregate demand channel. By building in the impact of
distortionary taxation, substitution of private and government consumption,
tax wedge eﬀects on pricing and wage-setting, and the impact of interest-rate
policy on deﬁcit ﬁnancing, a richer picture will doubtlessly emerge. This is
left to future work.
26Notes
1See for example Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), and more recently Perez
and Hiebert (2002) and Zagaglia (2002), who have experimented with DGE
model simulations which include some ﬁscal closure rules, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2002), Benigno and Woodford (2003)
2See Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001).
3The number of contributions applying VAR techniques is still scarce.
T h i sm a yb ed u et ot h ec r i t i q u ei nM o u n t f o r da n dU h l i g( 2 0 0 2 )t h a tt r u e
ﬁscal policy surprises may be diﬃcult to detect in a VAR model.
4Arguably, the open-economy considerations are less important to the
USA, which is the focus of our analysis here. The extension of our modeling
approach to the open economy is left to further work.
5This speciﬁcation is based on the assumption of external habit as in
Smets and Wouters (2002). Studies based on the assumption of internal habit
test a more complex dynamic equation, but cannot ﬁnd habit persistence in
t h eU S( L e i t ha n dM a l l e y ,2 0 0 2 ) .
6See also Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), and Sbordone (2002).
7This was pioneered by Galí and Gertler (1999). Similar backward-looking
elements can be introduced to the NKPC equation by introducing indexation
of all non-re-optimised prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001, and
Woodford, 2002, chapter 3).
8A similar speciﬁcation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be ob-
tained by making the indexation process part of the optimisation process
(see Smets and Wouters, 2002).
9Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) specify (10) in terms of average




10For instance, our modelling approach is not dissimilar to that adopted
in Leeper (1991, 1993). Since writing the ﬁrst draft of this paper we became
aware of the work by Perez and Hiebert (2002) and Zagaglia (2002), who
introduce endogenous ﬁscal actions in simulated theoretical DGE models.
11W h i c hi nt u r nb u i l d so na ne a r l i e rl i t e r a t u r ei nm o d e l sw i t h o u tn o m i n a l
rigidities (see e.g. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1991, 1999).
12The main diﬀerence is that we use contemporaneous and lagged values
of the output gap (see Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci, 2002) as opposed to
27expected future values, as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000). For a
detailed discussion of these issues, see Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b).
13See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) for a justiﬁcation of why a short
inﬂation-forecast horizon might be optimal in cases where the degree of ’rule
of thumb’ indexation (γ)o ri n ﬂation inertia is high.
14In general we did not ﬁnd that the debt/GDP ratio was signiﬁcant over
the full sample in either the tax or the expenditure equation. One possible
reason is that there might have been shifts in the ﬁscal regime, as suggested
by Favero and Monacelli (2003). As in the case with our monetary policy
r u l e sw ed on o tm o d e lr e g i m es w i t c h e s ,w h i c hi sa na s p e c tw h i c hw el e a v et o
further work.
15The estimation was carried out using RATS, version 5.
16Which is commonplace in this literature (see Smets and Wouters, 2002,
Leith and Malley, 2002).
17We experimented with both a HP ﬁl t e ra n dr e g r e s s i o no nap o l y n o m i a l
(cubic) trend for the real variables, and using CBO and OECD data on po-
tential output. The results reported here use a polynomial trend. Although
there is some diﬀerence in the series, the estimated structural parameters in
t h eN Km o d e l sa r en o tv e r yd i ﬀerent, and the lag structure of the backward-
looking model does not seem to be aﬀected. This implies that the monetary-
ﬁscal interactions which emerge from the dynamic simulations will not be
markedly diﬀerent.
18For instance, Galì, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2003), Leith and Malley
(2002), Kara and Nelson (2002).
19This follows Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). It is a lower value of the
elasticity of substitution than that used by Galí, Gertler and López-Salido
(2001) and Leith and Malley (2002), but in practice the estimates of the
other parameters did not seem to be very sensitive to changes in the value
of θ. However, a higher mark-up does seem to be more sensible given that
marginal costs exclude capital costs in this framework. In addition, a higher
value of θ would imply an implausibly small direct eﬀect of output on prices,
through the marginal cost term.
20We also tried to estimate the model using sub-sets of the instruments,
including estimating the models equation by equation. In all these cases the
J-test does not reject the null.
21It is reassuring to ﬁnd that in their celebrated paper, Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) are able to track down the risk-free rate for the US by
calibrating a model where β =0 .89, γ =2 , λ =0 .94.
2822See Clarida Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000), Muscatelli, Tirelli and Tre-
croci (2002), Cukierman and Muscatelli (2001).
23For some evidence on time-variation in monetary policy rules, see Mus-
catelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2002a).
24The model is solved using Winsolve version 3.0 (see Pierse, 2000), which
provides numerical solutions for linear and non-linear rational expectations
models. We solve our model using the Stacked Newton method in Winsolve.
In solving the models with structural shocks and deviations from the policy
rules (’policy shocks’), these are treated as unanticipated by economic agents.
25As all of our historical (counterfactual) simulations (ii) and (iii) are con-
ducted using 1990s data there is little diﬀerence in using actual data on real
wages and employment, as opposed to endogenising them as we do in dy-
namic simulation (i). This is because real wages and employment were far
less volatile around their trend during the 1990s.
26N o t et h a ti nt h ec a s eo fF i g u r e1t h ed a t e so nt h eh o r i z o n t a la x i sa r en o t
relevant, as we are not using actual data to simulate the models.
27The interested reader is referred to Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2002b),
where these simulations are reported in full.
28For empirical evidence on this point, see Cukierman and Muscatelli
(2001).
29We use the standard form of the government budget constraint, nor-
malised by output:
(D/Py)t =( 1+it)Dt−1/Ptyt +( g/y)t − (τ/y)t
where D is nominal debt. As our model is simulated in deviation from
equilibrium form, in order to simulate the budget constraint we use additional
equations linking real GDP, the price level and the levels of expenditure
and taxation revenues to, respectively, the output gap, inﬂation, and the
deviations in the ﬁscal variables. Clearly the one outstanding issue is that
our framework only models the short-term policy rate, the federal funds rate,
and not the average cost of debt. In addition, our expenditure data includes
interest payments. However, the purpose of this additional simulation is
simply as a check that our model does not imply an implausible path for
government debt. The simulated debt series is not used in any of our policy
experiments or policy analyses.
30Again, the results are computed using Winsolve.
2931So that the optimal interest rate rule depends on its previous value.
Indeed, Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) show that in certain circumstances
the optimal policy rule involves superinertial dynamics.
32i.e. our estimated policy rule may not be ’sub-optimal’ in the sense of
Giannoni and Woodford.
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